







The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity 
model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and 
the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is 
what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically-justified gravity model of 
trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data 
approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual 
gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the 
model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading 
partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States 
in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, 
whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts and embargoes are taken as security motives. The 
key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms 
trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs 
from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative 
importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-Cold War period, 
countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and 
embargoes play a role. 
JEL classification: F14, F51 









The Gravity of Arms 
1. Introduction 
Several recent research papers have stressed the importance of analyzing the determinants of 
international trade at the industry level to account for industry-specific economic and political 
factors (Head and Mayer, 2014). The armament industry has usually seen as particularly different 
from other industries (Kinsella, 1998; Blanton, 2000) regarding the role played by the political 
environment and the geopolitics of transfers in the decision to export (Catrina, 1998; Krause, 1991, 
1992; Anderton, 1995). Many developing countries have been increasing their capacity to produce 
arms and some are trying to establish a domestic military industry to be less dependent on imported 
arms (Brauer 2000; Blanton, 2005). However, these countries have yet to become successful 
exporters of arms on a larger scale (Brauer 2007). Meanwhile, the supply of military goods is very 
concentrated on a global scale1, with ten exporters covering more than ninety percent of the world 
market (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI) for the period from 1950 to 2007, 
and thus investigating the main motives that explain the international arms trade remains an 
important issue (Fleurant et al, 2017). 
Understanding how different factors, namely economic and political motives, affect the decision to 
export arms is crucial in providing a scientific basis for the public debate on the regulation of trade 
concerning major conventional weapons (MCW). Furthermore, strategic and security motives that 
could be the main drivers of demand constraints in the arms trade, are also a relevant focus of study. 
Such factors include conflicts, the degree of militarization of the society in question, the existence 
of military alliances and the effectiveness of embargoes.  
The importance of the political environment in the transfer decision, has been widely investigated in 
the political science literature (Krause, 1991, 1992; Blanton, 2000, 2005; Catrina, 1988; among 
others), but scarcely so in the economic literature (as noted by Anderton, 1995). The richness of the 
data available is suitable to apply a gravity model of trade to empirically investigate the drivers of 
the supply and demand factors, as well as to distinguish between the economic, political, strategic 








studies (Akerman and Seim, 2014 and Comola, 2012) that have made some progress in this 
direction.  
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the arms trade under the framework 
of the gravity model of trade, including several economic, political and security factors that affect 
the decision to export arms and the value of a trade deal by using a two-stage model suitable for 
analyzing the decision-making process. As key political factors, we consider the level of democracy 
in the trading partners as well as the political orientation of the ruling governments, the political 
differences between trading partners and their voting similarities. The security factors are conflicts, 
established military and strategic pacts and embargoes. To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
consistently examines the determinants of the extensive and intensive margins of the international 
arms trade using up-to-date panel data econometric models and a comprehensive sample of 
countries and years. 
The main contribution of this paper, with respect to previous studies, is that we base our empirical 
strategy on the new developments in the theory of international trade (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al, 
2008) and distinguish between the determinants of the decision to export (extensive margin of 
exports) and the determinants of the amount exported (intensive margin of exports). Moreover, we 
focus not only on the level of democracy as Akerman & Seim (2014) do, but also on the political 
orientation of the ruling governments as well as on the political similarities between trading 
partners. Whereas Comola (2012) used a categorical variable with only three dimensions2, limited 
time coverage and country-time variation to measure political orientation, we use a measure based 
on a country’s voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which has more 
variability and more extensive time coverage.  
Since both the decision to export arms and the amount exported may be related, we use a two-stage 
estimation procedure to control for selection bias (similar to Blanton, 2005) while also controlling 
for firm heterogeneity (Helpman et al. 2008), which indicates that only a few firms are able to cover 
the fixed costs of exporting that is necessary to become an exporter while other firms produce for 
the local market. We also control for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity by using well-
established econometric techniques (Baltagi and Egger, 2014).  
Our estimation framework is based on a theoretically justified gravity model of trade (Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman et al., 2008), which is applied to data for 104 exporters over the 
period from 1950 to 2007. To test for the robustness of the results, we estimate the model using 
																																																						
2 The tree dimensions are right, center and left oriented governments from the World Bank Development Research 
Group’s Database of Political Institutions. 
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several variations of our dataset and estimation techniques. Furthermore, we compare the 
determinants of the arms trade with those of trade in other goods and evaluate differences in the 
impact of the different dimensions considered, namely the economic, political and security factors. 
The main results show that the selected factors are relevant in explaining the two types of trade 
margins of the arms trade, but the effects differ for each trade margin. The end of the Cold War 
appears to have changed the impact of several political factors, especially those measuring the 
political and security factors. However, differences in political orientation continue to have a 
significant negative impact on two countries' probability of transferring arms in the 2000s. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature in this field 
and presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 gives an overview of the data and variables used 
and the main stylized facts. Section 4 presents the specification of the empirical models and Section 
5 outlines and discusses the main results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Related theories and empirical literature  
The existent literature concerning arms transfers is wide in the field of political science, starting 
with the classical works by Krause (1991, 1992), Laurance (1992) and Catrina (1988, 1994).  
Whereas Krause (1991) refers to the three dimensions of influence that relate to arms transfers, 
namely, bargaining power, structural power and hegemonic power, Krause (1992) and Laurence 
(1992) provide the framework for analysis of the different phases of arms trade history. Catrina 
(1994) focuses instead on the description of the different stages involved in arms transfers as well as 
the parties involved, their interest and all of the legal aspects related to it. Moreover, he identifies 
several relevant research questions, among them the need to use quantitative information to identify 
the general trends, the determinants and the mechanisms of arm transfers.  
To approve an international shipment of arms, the countries involved must first evaluate if the 
associated benefits outweigh the risks and costs attached to the trade deal. The gains for the 
exporting country include revenues for the domestic industry in the related sectors and in turn job 
protection in these sectors, while the costs are mainly related to political, economic and 
strategic/security factors (Brauer, 2000 and 2007; Blanton, 2005). Moreover, exporting should also 
generate increasing economies of scale in production, resulting in lower costs and enhanced 
international competitiveness of the firms involved (Anderton, 1995). These gains, however, can be 
offset by potential negative effects, which are linked to the fact that the exporting country loses 
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control over the arms once they are exported and this increase insecurity. Thus, these arms could 
eventually be used against the exporter or its allies and so the delivery of these tools of destruction 
can be problematic from a strategic and security standpoint. In addition, there is potential for 
copyright infringements and there may be negative reactions and pressure from third countries as a 
response to weapon exports. Democratic countries may see a strong, negative public reaction to 
their exports, especially if arms are exported to non-democratic authoritarian countries. 
From the point of view of the trade partners, the arms trade can establish or strengthen a given 
bilateral relationship. It can also lead to a transfer of knowledge3 or possibly attempt to influence 
the importer’s policies4 and could fuel an arms race in the region of the importer. All of these 
effects have different implications for the potential trading partners depending on the conditions of 
the contract. 
 The dependence theories in the political science literature (Catrina, 1988) state that arms trade 
might generate dependent relationships between suppliers and consumers. Catrina (1988) concludes 
that albeit being a contributing factor, arms transactions generate less dependence today than in the 
past and there are other factors that are more likely to generate dependence such as economic 
vulnerability or political stability. In this sense, it is crucial to consider political factors, such as the 
level of democracy or the political orientation, as explanatory factors of arms trade. 
In addition to the mostly self-serving reasons described above, the arms trade can also be the result 
of altruistic behavior, with the aim of helping the receiving country to maintain or re-establish 
safety and security (Akerman & Seim 2014). The potential positive and negative effects described 
above create uncertainty on the real outcomes in several different aspects related to the shipment of 
arms. The political orientation in a recipient country can be an indicator of the level of uncertainty, 
as can the political differences between a supplier and recipient. Indeed, some authors find that 
countries may discriminate against certain political regimes when exporting arms. In particular, 
Blanton (2000, 2005) finds that the United States largely exports arms to democratic countries, 
especially in the post-Cold War period. This could be due either to support for countries that are in 
close political alignment with the United States, or to the fact that the United States expects 
negative externalities to be minimized when exporting to democratic countries. This will be in 
accordance with the “liberal peace” or “democratic peace” hypothesis stating that democracies are 
less likely to be engaged in armed conflict with each other (Chan, 1997). 
																																																						





Anderton (1995) states that there is little theoretical and empirical development of the economics of 
arms transfers, with a few exceptions such as Levine, Sen and Smith (1994), Levine and Smith 
(1997) and Smith and Tasiran (2005). Most models are based on strategic behavior and/or demand 
and supply functions and their estimates. Anderton (1995) refers to the traditional and neoclassical 
international trade theories to explain the international demand and supply of weapons, and refers to 
the general equilibrium nature of arms trade highlighted by the neoclassical models, which predict 
that countries will specialize in the production and export of goods that intensively use the 
resources that are relatively abundant in a respective country. Accordingly, if arms production, and 
especially MCWs, uses capital intensively, the theory predicts that countries with a higher capital to 
labor ratio will have a comparative advantage in exporting arms. In addition, according to the new 
trade theories based on economies of scale and imperfect competition, we could assume that major 
weapons production is subject to economies of scale and hence countries will tend to specialize in 
the production and export a narrow range of products to exploit these economies of scale. 
 Finally, and not mentioned by Anderton (1995), we should refer to the new-new trade theories of 
trade that rely on heterogeneity in productivity among firms and predict the existence of zero trade 
flows in international trade, since only very few productive firms are able to cover the fix costs of 
exporting (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). A model that can be derived from all of these 
trade theories, and that has been labelled as the “workhorse” of empirical trade analysis, is the 
gravity model of trade (Feenstra, 2015; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). It has been extensively 
used to explain the determinants of aggregate and disaggregated bilateral trade flows and it is also 
suitable to explain bilateral arms transfers. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies using the gravity model of trade to explain 
arms transfers. Both studies use the same dataset on arms transfers and emphasize changes after the 
end of the Cold War. These studies differ in their political aspects and the time periods covered, 
their econometric approach and their main results. On the one hand, Akerman & Seim (2014) 
investigate the impact of the level of democracy on the probability of trading arms for many 
countries5 over the years 1962-2000, using a linear probability model with exporter and importer 
dummy variables that are used as proxies for unobserved factors that are country specific and time 
invariant. They find that the squared difference in polity (a proxy for democracy) between trading 
partners has a large and significant negative impact on the target variable, but that the effect 
																																																						
5	 The	 list	of	exporters	and	 importers	 included	 in	 the	estimations	 is	not	provided	by	Akerman	and	Seim	 (2014).	The	




becomes positive and non-significant after the end of the Cold War. The main shortcoming of this 
study is that they do not include security factors in their econometric model (embargos, pacts, 
conflicts) and in the network analysis they only consider trade among 34 countries (members of 
NATO plus members of the Warsaw Pact). Moreover, the only political factor considered is the 
difference in the levels of democracy between trading countries. A second limitation is that they 
focus only on the decision to trade arms, and thus fail to account for the effect on the traded value. 
A final limitation is the use of a linear probability model, since the residuals violate assumptions on 
homoskedasticity and the normality of errors and this invalidates the standard errors and tests.  
On the other hand, Comola (2012) extends the analysis by using the political orientation of the 
trading countries as a second political dimension, but fails to distinguish between the factors that 
affect the decision to export and those that affect the value of the transfer. She investigates the 
effect of two political dimensions, namely democracy and political orientation, on the volume of 
arms exported from the 20 major exporters to all independent countries recognized by the United 
Nations in the period 1975-2004. The estimation method is a gravity-type Tobit model with 
exporter, importer and time dummy variables. The main findings are that democracies tend to 
export and import higher amounts of arms than autocracies and that while democracies export them 
mostly to rich countries, autocracies tend to export to poor countries. Furthermore, sharing a 
political orientation has a positive impact on trade that sharply decreases after the end of the Cold 
War, especially for democracies. It is worth noting that the measure of political orientation used by 
Comola (2012), which is constructed using the World Bank Development Research Group’s 
Database of Political Institutions, has several shortcomings. First, it only covers the period after 
1974 and in many cases, has no information on the political orientation of the ruling party, resulting 
in many gaps in the dataset. Second, the variable is a subjective measure, which is not strictly 
comparable between countries and identifies only three categories that cannot capture smaller 
differences in political orientation. Third, it focuses on economic policy rather than on foreign 
policy and has no variation over time for communist countries, while capitalist or market liberal 
countries have governments from all three categories.  
Both studies find that political determinants are important in terms of explaining the international 
flows of major conventional weapons (MCWs) and describe a decrease in the importance of 
political differences between a supplier and recipient after the end of the Cold War. However, both 
studies fail to acknowledge the recent advances in panel data gravity models that allow the 
extensive and the intensive margin of trade to be distinguished between and to account for the fact 
that both are interdependent. A two-stage model in the spirit of Helpman et al. (2008) allows for 
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this distinction and for the evaluation of the decision-making process (as proposed by Blanton, 
2005). The first stage addresses whether an economy is eligible to receive MCWs, whereas the 
second stage is based on the decision of the amount of arms transferred. Only the countries that 
successfully pass the selection stage are eligible as recipients of MCWs. 
We will extend these studies by using a more comprehensive dataset that includes all exporters6 and 
importers trading arms, an extended set of policy variables and security and strategic factors 
(embargoes and pacts), as well as a more suitable estimation technique that allows us to distinguish 
between the effect on the extensive and intensive margins of the arms trade. Indeed, we can 
distinguish between economic, security (defense pacts and embargoes) and political motives. 
An additional issue that has special interest for arms trade is the evolution over time of trade 
restrictions on MCWs, which has been covered by Levine and Smith (1997) and more extensively 
by Bromley et al. (2012). International trade in MCWs has been generally controlled by national 
governments. The corresponding authorities in each country select the potential buyers based on 
judgments concerning the intentions of how the weapons will be used. There have always been 
several multilateral controls; the most extensive agreement signed in the past was the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was established in 1949 by western 
countries to stop the Soviet Union and its satellite countries from buying weapons and technologies 
from western producers. It lasted until 1994 and was replaced two years later with the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
(WAECC). The main difference with the COCOM is that the WAECC covers 41 States, including 
Russia and other COCOM countries7, with its main aim to contribute to regional and international 
security and stability. 
More recently, after many years of difficult negotiations, the landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 
regulating the international trade in conventional arms and including small arms, entered into force 
in December 2014. With 90 state parties, 88 ratifying countries and 130 signatory countries, it is the 
most comprehensive treaty ever signed. It requires state parties to establish and maintain export 
control systems that are transparent and comply with the provisions and enforcement of relevant 
prohibitions of the ATT. Given that the ATT has only been in force for a few years, it is outside the 
scope of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness of the treaty. 
																																																						
6	Blanton	(2005)	focused	on	United	States	exports	exclusively.	
7	 List	 of	 participants:	 Argentina,	 Australia,	 Austria,	 Belgium,	 Bulgaria,	 Canada,	 Croatia,	 Czech	 Republic,	 Denmark,	
Estonia,	 Finland,	 France,	 Germany,	 Greece,	 Hungary,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Japan,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	 Luxembourg,	 Malta,	
Mexico,	 Netherlands,	 New	 Zealand,	 Norway,	 Poland,	 Portugal,	 Republic	 of	 Korea,	 Romania,	 Russian	 Federation,	
Slovakia,	Slovenia,	South	Africa,	Spain,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	Turkey,	Ukraine,	United	Kingdom	and	United	States.	
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Meanwhile, single countries have their own control regimes, but the information about the way 
controls are established is not always transparent and differs greatly across countries. Given the lack 
of available information for all countries and over time for specific controls, we are not able to 
directly consider them in the regression analysis. We could only assume that they are country 
specific and vary slowly over time and try to model them with country specific dummy variables.  
2.2 Theoretical framework 
In this subsection, we develop the theoretical arguments that provide a rationale for the 
consideration not only of economic factors, but also of political and security factors in creating 
frictions/enhancers to trade in MCWs. We discuss the political and security motives and incorporate 
those in the framework of the international trade literature.  
The case of the arms trade is particularly different from trade in other goods. The demand for arms 
is mainly related to security concerns for internal, as well as external threats, for having to engage 
in a conflict (Levine and Smith, 1997). Arms demand is also used as a preventive measure to emit a 
general posture of power. However, this could generate insecurity in other countries. For this 
reason, minimizing the existence of arms should be the optimal outcome for maximizing the utility 
of the world economy. Consumers in a given country would therefore prefer a reduced supply of 
MCWs at a higher cost, so that it is difficult for other countries to compete in the industry and to 
generate insecurity for the larger producers. As a consequence, the forces of the market result in the 
existence of a few suppliers with a small number of large firms exporting MCWs and operating in 
imperfect competition. The exporters, which are mostly global dominant players, would prefer not 
to export large quantities to any of the recipients in order to maintain its dominant power. 
National security concerns could be influenced by the formation of pacts or alliances. In fact, the 
risk of not having arms is reduced by being part of an alliance,8 which in turn implies a cumulative 
value of regional security. Thus, national security will be a function of domestic and regional 
security, and the weight that regional security will play will depend on the “dominant role” of an 
exporter.  
According to the international trade literature, higher bilateral trade volumes between countries are 
a direct consequence of higher incomes in the trading economies, lower trade barriers between them 
and a greater proportion of exporters (Helpman et al., 2008). The gravity model of trade indicates 
that some trade frictions would have an influence on the fixed cost of exporting, whereas others 
would mainly affect the variable cost and hence, the export volume, once the exporting decision has 
																																																						
8	Military pacts can be classified as defence, nonaggression, entente and neutrality pacts.	
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been made. The level of income in a supplier country indicates the production capacity of the 
country, whereas the income in a recipient country indicates the market size of the buying economy. 
On the other hand, income per capita could be a proxy for the relative factor endowments of the 
supplier, with rich countries tending to be capital abundant in relative terms. The level of income 
per capita in a recipient country could indicate the type of good that the country could be able to 
buy, with rich countries being able to buy –more expensive– higher quality goods.  
With respect to trade frictions (facilitators), it is expected that the classical proxy for trade cost, the 
distance between countries, decreases the likelihood that two countries will trade, but could also 
affect the exported value, whereas other factors such as common language, common borders would 
mainly affect the fixed cost of exporting. The effect of distance on the value exported could also be 
positive assuming that countries send higher average quantities to countries far away, so that in case 
the recipients would use the weapons, the supplier is far from the potential user of the weapons. 
Intending to use the gravity model to explain trade in MCWs implies that we must consider specific 
factors that are especially relevant for this industry. According to Levine and Smith (1997) concerns 
about internal stability, regional hostility, general insurance and demonstration of power determine 
the need for arms. 
Hence, we extend the typical gravity model of trade with several factors used as proxies for the 
abovementioned factors. First, we test not only for the importance of the level of democracy in a 
supplier and recipient of arms, which serve as a proxy for internal stability, but also the difference 
between them to test for the democratic peace hypothesis. 
Second, knowing that staying in power is one of the objectives of the dominant MCWs exporter, the 
United States, we use the voting similarity between the United States and the exporter and the 
United States and the importer as proxies for the affinity between the superpower and the rest of the 
potential suppliers and recipient of arms. We expect that voting similarity is a proxy for political 
affinity and orientation and hence a higher level of voting discrepancy with the United States is 
expected to be positively related with arms trade in the supply side and negatively related in the 
demand side. In particular, it is expected that arms transfers to a given destination increase when 
there are cordial diplomatic relations between the United States and the destination countries. In 
addition, the voting similarity between the trading partners is also added as a proxy of political 
affinity between them, which is expected to be positively related to arms trade. 
Finally, the gravity model is also augmented with the level of militarization in the economy, which 
is a proxy of the desire to project power internationally. Militarization can affect the supply and 
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demand of arms through various channels (Smith and Tasiran, 2005, 2010). A higher degree of 
militarization and in turn a higher domestic demand for arms is expected to strengthen a domestic 
arms industry and hence could foster exports. But since the domestic production of arms and 
equipment is usually preferred to foreign production, for strategic reasons, a higher militarization 
could also be related to lower exports if the domestic demand increases and foreign demand 
decreases, as happened in the post-Cold War period. This is especially true when domestic 
production can satisfy the needs of the military. Concerning the demand side, a higher degree of 
militarization could increase domestic demand for arms and this in turn could help to develop the 
local arms industry, but if a country cannot successfully replace imports through internal 
production, demand for foreign arms should be positively related to the size of the military industry. 
 
Our central hypotheses are: 
1. Economic factors: a higher level of GDP indicates higher production capabilities and hence 
a higher supply of MCWs. As a country succeeds in developing a more advanced military 
industry, its unit cost of production will decrease. However, a higher level of GDP will also 
imply a greater absorptive capacity, especially for countries with a large military 
expenditure, and hence be related with lower average exports of MCWs. The level of GDP 
in the importing country indicates its capacity to buy advanced military MCWs and hence 
also a positive relation with arms trade is expected. 
2. Political orientation: it will be more likely for democracies to become exporters of MCWs, 
especially during the cold war, assuming that the weapons are mainly demanded for security 
reasons and given the threats from the USSR. However, in the post-Cold War era and given 
the global reduction in security treats, it will be more likely that less democratic countries 
become exporters. From the demand side, higher levels of democracy are related to more 
internal security and to a lower probability of importing MCWs. In the second stage process, 
the level of democracy in an exporter country does not influence the amount of the transfer, 
whereas for a recipient, it could be that the amount transferred decreases for destinations 
with lower levels of democracy, conditional on the fact that the transfer has been approved. 
3. Democratic peace hypothesis: Since the level of trust between democracies is higher, 
countries with lower differences in democracy scores will more likely trade MCWs (a 
similar level of trust could also exist between autocracies). The level of voting affinity could 
also be related to taste similarities and strategic behavior and hence is expected to be 
12	
positively related with the likelihood of arms transfers. As for the second stage, the volume 
of arms traded could be higher among democracies or autocracies mainly during the Cold 
War, since after 1990 other factors may play a role such as a respect for human rights and 
friendly diplomatic relations. Hence, we expect that voting similarity will be positively 
related to the amount transferred, given that the transfer has been approved, but only in the 
post-Cold War era. 
4. Security motives (pacts, embargoes and conflicts): Pacts, and in particular defense, non-
aggression and entente pacts, should increase the likelihood of exporting MCWs, since the 
members trust each other and are not supposed to use the weapons against the other country 
members of the pacts. Countries in conflict will tend to sign more transfer agreements on 
MCWs; however, exporters could restrict the amount exported to those countries if arms are 
used against minority groups or violating human rights. Hence the probability to export 
arms could increase with conflict in the recipient countries, but the amount transferred could 
decrease with conflict once we consider that not all transfers are approved. 
 
3. Data Description, Variables and Stylized Facts 
In our analysis, we combine information from different fields of research and various sources to 
measure the determinants of the arms trade. This section describes the data and the construction of 
the variables included in the analysis. The study covers the period from 1950 to 2007 and uses data 
for 104 suppliers of arms and 154 recipients, listed in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. 
3.1  Arms trade 
The available trade classifications do not provide a straightforward identification of the arms trade 
and ammunition. Although recent revisions of the categories listed in the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (HS) allow us to isolate exports and imports of arms and 
ammunition9, the data is mostly based on reports given by the importing and exporting countries10 
with states often failing to fully comply with reporting regulations (Brauer, 2007). Therefore, we 
use data on arms transfers from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. It covers MCWs including air 
defense systems, aircrafts, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, engines (for 
																																																						
9	 For	 example,	 the	 HS-1992	 goods	 category	 has	 an	 entry	 for	 “arms	 and	 ammunition	 and	 parts	 and	 accessories	
thereof”	(HS-93).	
10	 Due	 to	 confidentiality	 reasons,	 countries	may	not	 report	all	 of	 their	detailed	 trade.	 In	data	 sources,	 such	as	UN	
Comtrade,	this	trade	will	usually	be	included	in	a	category	called	“others”	and	in	the	total	trade	value.		
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ships, armored vehicles and aircrafts), missiles, satellites, sensors, ships and components such as 
guns and turrets. Information comes from various sources including the media, governments, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and international institutions. The transfers can be of an 
official or unofficial nature and not necessarily involve a direct payment. Transfers to rebel groups 
or NGOs within the recipient countries are excluded from our sample. 
In addition to agreements of transfers, SIPRI also provides a separate dataset with information on 
the value of the shipment between the two parties in the year of the delivery. This dataset is based 
on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the 
transfer of military resources rather than the financial value or sales price of the traded amount. For 
used arms, the volume is reduced between 33-60 percent depending on whether it has been 
significantly refurbished. The reported value is referred to as the trend-indicator value (TIV) and it 
is given in millions of USD at constant (1990) prices. Deliveries with a value of less than USD 
500,000 are denoted as a zero. When the transfer in a given year is delivered over several years, we 
split the number of products among the years. We have coded the information contained in the 
trade registers, which contain information about the year of order or license, the year(s) of delivery, 
as well as the number of weapons ordered and delivered, and the type of weapon. Moreover, there 
are comments indicating whether the transfer is an aid transfer or a licensed transfer and whether it 
consists of second hand weapons or not. Next, we have linked the information on trade deliveries 
in the trade register with the value of the shipment in the TIV dataset.   
3.2 Explanatory variables: Economic, Security and Political factors 
3.2.1 Economic and geographical and cultural variables 
The economic variables, namely, gross domestic product (GDP) is from the Maddison Project, 
which is, to our knowledge, the only source of GDP data that also covers socialist or communist 
countries. Population data are from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank and is 
used to calculate GDP per capita. 
Cultural and geographical characteristics are measured with several variables taken from the Centre 
d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII), namely distance between capital 
cities and dummy variables indicating if countries share a border, use the same language, have had a 
colonial relationship in the past and are landlocked.  
3.2.2 Security factors 
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We use data on conflicts provided by the dataset of armed conflicts from the Centre for the Study of 
Civil War (CSCW) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University.  
Information on mandatory UN embargoes for the whole period comes from the SIPRI Arms 
Embargoes Database. This data has also been completed using information from a comprehensive 
dataset on embargoes, which has been put together by Ericson (2013) for the period 1981 to 2004. 
Data on the share of military personnel comes from the National Material Capabilities (v4.0) dataset 
and information on military and strategic pacts comes from the Formal Alliances (v4.0) dataset of 
the Correlates of War Project (COW). 
3.2.3 Political factors 
In order to present a simplified picture of the global political landscape, we distinguish between two 
different political dimensions: the level of democracy and voting similarity as a proxy for political 
orientation. This gives us four main groups of governments: left-oriented democracies, right-
oriented democracies, left-oriented autocracies and right-oriented autocracies (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Political Dimensions  
For the level of democracy, data comes from the polity2 variable in the POLITY IV database hosted 
by the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University. It ranges from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). As described in Section 2, the most commonly used 
measure for political orientation (Comola, 2012) has several flaws. We therefore measure political 
orientation using a new approach, which differs from Comola (2012).  
In the last sixty years, the world may have shifted from a bipolar system to a unipolar or multipolar 
system, but the United States remains the sole superpower. Since the United States has been the 
main exporter of arms in the period under study, we take the political orientation of the United 
States as a point of reference and measure the similarity in political orientation of a country to the 
United States by using the similarity index, which is based on the voting behavior in the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA).  
 The data is from the UNGA Voting Dataset by Voeten and Strezhnev (2009). The authors 
constructed a voting similarity index equal to the total number of votes where both states agreed and 
divided by the total number of joint votes. It varies between 0 and 1 (agre3un) and is computed 
based on three categories (approval, abstain and disapproval on an issue) and where abstention is 
counted as halfway between a yes or no vote. The data is described by the authors as measuring 
common “interests” or “preferences” and we attribute differences in the UNGA voting behavior to 
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differences in the political alignment of the foreign policy. We use the similarity index for the 
trading countries and also the similarity between the United States and any other country in the 
world. 
We believe that our method captures the political orientation in a more accurate way than the 
measure used by Comola (2012). To illustrate our argument, we give the following example: The 
Labour government of Tony Blair in United Kingdom (1998-2010) and the republican government 
of George W. Bush in the United States (2001-2008) have usually been perceived as being very 
similar regarding foreign policy. Nevertheless, according to the dataset of the World Bank, they 
hold opposing positions regarding political orientation, while their voting concordance in the UN 
General Assembly is among the highest for all countries during that period. Furthermore, there was 
substantial cooperation between the two governments in the exchange of arms. According to the 
SIPRI dataset, there were 44 agreements to trade arms between the two countries in the period 
2001-2008, a very high number indeed. 
 
3.2 Stylized facts 
In what follows, we examine the evolution over decades of the correlation between both political 
dimensions, namely the level of democracy and the common “interest” with the United States of 
each country. In Figure 2 the vertical axis shows the level of democracy that varies between -10 and 
+10 and the degree of voting similarity between a given country and the United States over time 
that varies between 0 and 1 on the horizontal axis. The figure shows the scatter plot between both 
variables in six different years, one by decade. For each year, four quadrants are drawn to facilitate 
visual inspections of where countries are located. Very democratic countries (polity2>0) and with a 
high voting similarity index with the United States (index>0.5) are in the upper-right quadrant, 
whereas countries with a low polity2 and with a below-average similarity index are in the lower-left 
quadrant. Conversely, the upper-left quadrant is for democratic countries with a below-average 
voting similarity index and the lower-right quadrant for countries with a very similar voting 
behavior to the United States and below-average polity2 index. Interestingly, the upper-left 
quadrant was empty in 1955 and only 7-8 countries move into it in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
after the mid-1980s, many countries are located in it, with more than 60 countries in 2005. The 
opposite trend is observed in the lower-right quadrant, which is quite populated in the first three 
decades, but empty in the 1980s, 1990s (almost empty) and 2000, with no countries having a high 
voting similarity and a low level of democracy. 
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Voting similarity with the United States shows an average decline over time, and the level of 
democracy has risen after a downturn in the 1970s. The only persistent pattern we find is a group of 
highly democratic countries with relatively similar voting behavior to the United States that mostly 
consists of northern democracies and have been in the upper-right quadrant (e.g. UK, Sweden) but 
have moved slightly to the left, due to a decreasing voting similarity with the United States. 
Figure 2. Political Orientation and the Level of Democracy in Single Years 
Figure 3 shows the evolution over time of export shares of the main exporters of MCWs. The 
United States and Russia (Soviet Union until 1989) are the dominant exporters with more than 50 
percent of the market in 2007, followed by Germany with a 12 percent share, France with 9 percent 
and the UK with almost 4 percent. The most dramatic increase in export share can be observed for 
China, which was supplying almost 7 percent of the market in 2016.  
Figure 3. The Evolution over Time of Export Shares in MCWs for Main Exporters 
Figure 4 shows the evolution over time of the value of MCWs exported indicating that the volume 
of exports increased for most main exporters until the late 1970s. In the early 1980s, a downward 
trend is observed mainly in the Soviet Union and the United States, and in other main exporters, 
such as France and Germany, since the mid-1980s. Both the United States and Russia started to 
increase their exports again after 2002 onwards, as did Germany, the UK and China. The general 
trend of the aggregated exports of MCWs is better seen in Figure 5, which shows the evolution over 
time of the volume of world exports of major arms. Two clear turning points are observed, the first 
in the early 1980s, when most providers started to decrease their exported volume and the second in 
the early 2000s, when some of the “new” exporters, such as China, started to be important players 
in the market and some of the “strategic” exporters started to increase their exports again11. 
 
Figure 4. Evolution over Time of MCWs Export Values for Main Exporters 






4 Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we first present the model specifications for the determinants of the probability of 
trading arms and of the volume traded and the two-stage estimation strategy. Secondly, we proceed 
to compare trade in goods with the arms trade. 
4.1 Model specification 
The econometric analysis is based on the gravity model of trade augmented with several variables 
that capture the political environment of the supplier and recipient countries and security factors 
that are expected to influence the arms trade. The gravity model has been widely used to model 
bilateral flows and is a suitable tool for estimating the effect of specific economic, cultural, 
geostrategic and political factors on trade (Head and Mayer, 2014; Baltagi et al, 2014). It was first 
used to estimate trade flows by Tinbergen (1962), extended with theoretical foundations by 
Anderson (1979) and later by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), which accounts for relative trade 
costs in the form of multilateral resistance to trade. 
As explanatory factors for the arms trade, we use standard gravity variables, namely GDP and GDP 
per capita, the distance between a country-pair and categorical variables that control for 
geographical and cultural closeness (Bergstrand, 1985, 1989). In addition, we control for strategic 
and security motives affecting the demand and supply of arms, namely the existence of conflicts in 
a recipient country, arms embargoes against a recipient country and military pacts and strategic 
agreements between a supplier and recipient. Another factor that could be considered as strategic, 
we use information on the industrial capacity of the domestic arms industry12 and the domestic 
demand for arms. Since this information is not available for the whole period, we use the share of 
military personnel divided by the total population as a proxy to measure the degree of militarization 
in a country and the subsequent demand for military equipment.  
Political factors are modelled using the above-mentioned variables: the level of democracy for a 
supplier and recipient, the absolute difference in both dimensions between a supplier and recipient, 
the voting similarity index between the United States and a supplier and reporter and the voting 
similarity index between the trading partners. 
A Probit model is specified to estimate the determinants of the probability that countries i and j 
agree on a transfer of MCWs in year t: 
																																																						





( ) ( )ijttjiijt ++++X'+=X=TransferPr εγλκβαφ        1 ,     (1) 
where the dependent variable, Transferijt, takes the value of one if the potential importer, j, placed 
an order for MCWs from the supplier i, or in the case of licensed production, if a license was issued 
in year t, and zero otherwise. The vector of regressors X is assumed to influence the outcome and 
consists of the following variables13: ln GDPit and ln GDPjt denote, respectively, the natural 
logarithm of supplier GDP and recipient GDP in year t; and ln GDPpcit and ln GDPpcjt, denote the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita for countries i and j, respectively. Trade costs are proxied by 
geographical and cultural distance and are measured by the natural logarithm of the distance 
between the capitals of i and j (ln Distanceij); a dummy variable that takes the value of one if i and j 
share a border (Contiguityij), speak a common language (Languageij) or have had a common 
colonial relationship (Colonyij); and a variable that takes the value of one if both countries are 
landlocked (Landlockedij). 
The first political dimension in the model is the level of democracy. We account for the level of 
democracy for a supplier (Polityit) and recipient (Polityjt), and the absolute difference in the level of 
democracy between the two (Polity_diffijt)14. 
 The second dimension, the voting similarity with the United States, is specified in a similar fashion 
for the supplier (agreeUN_United Statesit), the recipient (agreeUN_United Statesjt) and the voting 
similarity between countries i and j (agreeUN_ijt). 
The degree of militarization is included for a supplier (Militarizationit) and recipient 
(Militarizationjt). The dummy variable Conflictjt takes the value of one when the government of a 
recipient country has been involved in a military conflict with another party in the last two years 
resulting in more than 24 battle-related deaths in the last two years. Military Pactijt is a variable that 
takes the value of one if countries i and j have any kind of military or strategic agreement or 
alliance in place in year t. This can either be to remain neutral, a promise not to attack each other 
(non-aggression), to consult each other if a crisis occurs (entente) or to defend each other (defense). 
MandatoryUN_embargoes jt takes the value of one if a mandatory UN embargo is in place against 
country j in year t.  
The main concern regarding the estimation of equation (1) is finding an appropriate estimation 
technique to control for unobservable heterogeneity that is time invariant and country specific, or 





number of observations in our sample (more than 500,000), we have chosen to include country 
fixed effects by “brute-force” as specified in equation (1), the disadvantage of which is the high 
demand in terms of computational power. According to Baltagi (2013), the bias is considerably 
reduced when there the number of observations is large.  
Estimates of the probability of trading arms do not account for the value of the shipment but simply 
if a trade deal was agreed upon. Thus, exporting a single armored vehicle is given the same 
importance as exporting 200 fighter aircrafts. To account for the size of the shipment, we estimate a 
model using the value of the trade deal as the dependent variable and similar explanatory variables 
as in model (1): 
ijttjiijt ε++λ+κ+X+=Volume γβα 'ln 0 . (2) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the value of exported MCWs from country i to 
country j in year t, sourced from the SIPRI Dataset on Transferred Arms. As opposed to model (1), 
where t specifies the year of the agreement in a trade deal, here t denotes the time of the delivery of 
the exported arms. Thus, a trade deal that was agreed in one year and that only appears once in 
model (1), can be delivered over several years and appear in model (2) several times, with the value 
shipped for the year in question.  
In model (2), the dependent variable is transformed by taking the natural logarithm, hence trade 
flows with a value of zero are not considered in the model. This may cause a sample selection bias 
associated with unobserved barriers to exporting arms that are correlated with observed factors and 
are important in explaining the export flow between countries i and j. The bias could be particularly 
large due to the very high percentage of zeros in the dependent variable of almost 98 percent. 
Furthermore, due to the wide range of industries involved in the military industrial complex and the 
importance of firm cooperation, we expect firms in this sector to be very heterogeneous. If we do 
not control for this heterogeneity, estimates of the intensive margin of trade (the quantity exported) 
will be biased. 
Following the theoretical development of Helpman et al. (2008), we estimate a two-stage model that 
allows us to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and for sample selection bias. The estimation 
of the model consists of an extension of the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach commonly used to 
correct for selection bias. In this approach, two elements of the first stage estimation (a Probit 
model to estimate the probability of exporting arms in each single year) are used in the second stage 
as a proxy for firm heterogeneity and to correct for sample selection bias. The subsequent procedure 
for panel data sample selection models is discussed in Wooldrige and in Baltagi et al. (2014).  
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In the first stage, we estimate the Probit model on the probability of trading MCWs from country i 
to j in each year t: 
( ) ( )ijttjiijt ε+γ+λ+κ+βX'+α=X=TradePr  φ1 ,     (3) 
The model differs from equation (1) in the dependent variable, which in equation (3) is the 
probability of exporting (delivering) arms from country i to country j in year t (Tradeijt) and not the 
probability of placing an order or the agreement on a trade deal15. In the second stage, the 
dependent variable is the value of exported MCWs from country i to j in year t. The model is 
specified as: 





ˆˆˆ' lnX . (4) 
      where  ijtitijtε ωµ +=  
Following Helpman et al. (2008), we include two additional terms as regressors in the second stage. 
First, the linear prediction of exports from model (3) down-weighted by its standard error (Ẑ), as 
well as the corresponding squared and cubed term (to introduce non linearities), and the inverse 
Mill's ratio (IMR) also from model (3). The former terms correct the bias generated by the 
underlying unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, whereas the latter is a correction for sample 
selection, which addresses the biases generated by unobserved shocks. Model (4) is estimated using 
the Mundlak (1978) [and Chamberlain (1984) and Wooldridge (2002)] approach, which involves 
projecting the effect of the group means of the time varying variables. In a panel data framework, it 
is implemented by estimating a random effects Probit model augmented with the group means of 
the time varying variables (G ). 
To fulfil the exclusion restriction of the Heckman approach, we use a variable that only affects the 
probability of exporting, but not the value exported, and hence does not enter the second step 
model. The variable measuring mandatory UN embargoes is the best candidate for this purpose. In 
fact, the assumption that mandatory embargoes, which are aimed at stopping arms exports to a 
given destination, only affect the probability and not the value of exports seems intuitive. Indeed, 
this variable yields no significant estimates when included in model (2). The intuitive explanation 
for this is that once a supplier of arms is willing to violate the embargo, it will do so regardless of 






4.2 Trade in Arms versus Trade in Goods  
In previous sections, we have emphasized the importance of political factors in explaining the 
transfers of arms. However, we have not yet answered the question of whether the impact of these 
factors is specific to the nature of the arms trade or whether it applies for trade flows in general. A 
direct comparison of estimates for all goods could provide evidence of whether the determinant of 
trade considered exert a different impact on trade in goods and on arms transfers, in terms of 
direction, extent and significance of the effect16. 
In order to make a direct comparison, we construct a dataset that includes the same set of countries 
over the same years for trade in goods and for arms transfers. This reduces the number of 
observations significantly, especially for communist countries and in the early years of the period 
under study. Information on trade flows from goods comes from the United Nations Comtrade 
Database for the years 1962-2007. The empirical strategy is similar, with the only difference being 
that the exclusion restriction in the first step estimation of the Helpman et al. (2008) approach is not 
embargoes but conflicts. 
5 Main Results 
We first present estimations of the traditional gravity model of trade with three different sets of 
explanatory factors: economic, political and security factors, using the probability of placing an 
order for a shipment of MCWs as the dependent variable. Next, we present the results of the 2-stage 
model that considers firms heterogeneity and selection into exporting arms and goods. 
Panel estimates of Model (1) for the different groups of variables measuring the different factors 
that influence the probability of transfer MCWs are reported in Table 1. Column (1) shows the 
results of the traditional gravity model with year Fixed Effects and column (2) adds exporter and 
importer fixed effects17. The rest of the Table shows the average marginal effect obtained for the 
model in column (2) for the whole period in column (3) and for the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods in (4) and (5), respectively.   
Estimates of the standard gravity variables, mostly have the expected signs. GDP has a significant 





17	The	 large	 time	dimension	 in	our	data	set	mitigates	 the	potential	bias	 that	arises	due	 to	 the	 incidental	parameter	
problem	 in	Probit	panel	data	models	with	country	dummy	variables.	The	bias	 is	of	order	 (1/T),	 therefore	 it	 is	 lower	
than	2	percent	in	our	sample.		
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significant and negative impact for the exporter and positive impact for the importer. Geographical 
variables also show the expected results, with negative and significant coefficients for distance, a 
positive, but not significant, coefficient for a common border and a negative and significant effect 
for landlocked countries, but only in column (1). Cultural similarities, measured by a shared 
colonial past and common official language, show a positive and significant effect for colonial links 
and a non-significant effect for common language18. 
The variables that serve as a proxy for the country-specific level of democracy have a statistically 
significant impact on the probability of ordering an arms transaction in column (1) and column (2), 
the score of democracy has a positive effect on the likelihood of exporting arms and a negative 
effect on the likelihood of importing arms. In other words, an increase in the polity index of a 
supplier, significantly increases the probability of exporting arms; whereas the effect of a decrease 
in the polity score increases the probability to receive arms for a recipient. The effect of the 
exporter’s level of democracy changes direction in the post-Cold War period, when it is also 
negative and significant (column 5), indicating that after the 1990s less democratic countries are 
more likely to export arms.  
With respect to voting with the United States, the estimates loss significance when adding country 
fixed effects and switch sign in case of the supplier. The results in column (2) indicate that countries 
with a higher voting similarity score are less likely to become arms exporters and/or importers. 
However, the coefficient of the voting similarity score between trading partners is positive and 
significant, but only during the Cold War period, showing that countries with similar “strategic 
preferences” were more likely to conduct arms transfer agreements.  
These effects become non-significant in the post-Cold War period, indicating that the voting 
similarity as a proxy of “strategic” friends has lost importance over time. However, this is not the 
case for the democracy scores that remain significant after 1990 (column 5). The main change is 
that the effect of the democracy level in the exporter country changes from negative to positive, 
indicating that more democratic countries are more likely to agree in transferring arms after 1990. 
 Concerning the differences in political factors between trading countries, an increase in the 
absolute difference between the polity scores between countries i and j has a significant negative 
impact on the probability of making a trade deal before and after 1990, but increasing similarity in 





Comparing our results with Akerman and Seim (2014), they found that differences in the political 
orientation do have a significant impact on the probability of two countries engaging in an arms 
trade, but only before and not after 1989, whereas in our results the coefficient is significant in both 
periods. This could be because their post war sample only contains 11 years and thus there is not 
enough information to obtain an accurate estimate19. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that we 
find an overall loss of significance of the UN voting similarity variables in the post-Cold War 
period. 
Security factors are also relevant. While military pacts and conflicts in the recipient countries 
always significantly increase the probability of ordering a transfer, embargoes against a recipient 
have a negative impact. It is worth noting that the impact of the military pact halves in the period 
after 1990 (column 5, Table 1) and the impact of conflicts increased by one-third. In comparative 
terms, pacts exerted much greater influence on the probability of trading arms during the Cold War, 
but remain more important than conflicts in the post-Cold War. The average marginal effects 
reported in columns (3) to (6) indicate that a pair of countries with a military pact have a 2.1 percent 
greater probability to order a transfer than those without. Similarly, when there is a conflict in a 
recipient country, the probability of ordering an arms trade is 0.5 percent higher than for countries 
not in conflict (column 3 in Table 1). Countries with mandatory embargoes have a 1 percent lower 
probability of ordering an arms trade. Interestingly, militarization in the exporting country makes 
trade deals more likely to happen during the Cold War period (column 4), supporting the 
economies-of-scale argument; whereas in the second period, the opposite is true, indicating that 
increases in military personnel tend to reduce the probability of approving arm transfers (column 5), 
perhaps due to an increase in the domestic use of arms. The effect in the post-Cold War era almost 
triples that of the previous period. Militarization of the importer country, which is used as a proxy 
for the domestic demand of arms, has a negative but non-significant effect on the probability of 
importing arms in any of the specifications. 
	
Table 1: Probability of Agreeing on an Arms Transfer 
 
Regression results using the traded value of arms as the dependent variable are shown in Table 220. 





extended with the average of the time variant variables. To control for various biases described 
above, we show results for the second step of the Helpman et al. (2008) approach in columns (2) to 
(4) of Table 2, first controlling for selection bias by introducing the inverse Mills Ratio in column 
(2), next, controlling for the extensive margin of trade using the prediction obtained from a Probit 
model estimated for single years in column (3) and for both factors in column (4), which 
corresponds to model (4). Results for pre- and post-Cold War periods from model (4) are also 
shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.  
The estimates are substantially different from the ones shown for the probability of ordering a 
transfer and are indeed not comparable. Concerning the policy variables, we can see in column (1) 
that the level of democracy of the supplier shows a non-significant estimate, different to Comola 
(2012)21, and a non-significant estimate of the level of democracy in the importing country and of 
the differences in polity in columns (2) and (4) after controlling for sample selection. Instead, the 
democracy-difference coefficient is positive and statistically significant in columns (5) for the Cold 
War period, indicating that a twenty-point increase in the difference in country’s level of democracy 
increases the value of the arms exported by around 0.56 percent (column (5)), indicating that the 
amounts traded with less similar countries in terms of democracy scores are on average higher in 
magnitude, conditional on the transfer having been approved.  
The coefficients of the supplier’s and the recipient’s voting concordance with the United States in 
the UN General Assembly are non-significant in column (1), but when controlling for sample 
selection (columns (2) and (4)) the estimate of the exporter voting similarity with the United States 
turns out to be negative and significant, indicating that decreasing voting similarity is associated 
with higher export values, once the transfers have been approved. Interestingly, this result is due to 
the coefficient being significant during the Cold War period only. Indeed, when the countries have a 
more similar voting pattern to the United States, they tend to transfer smaller amounts of arms, 
whereas the importer’s voting similarity with the United States does not seem to affect the amount 
of MCWs transferred. With respect to the voting similarity between the trading countries 
(agreeUN_ij), controlling for selection bias renders the coefficient non-significant for the entire 
sample period (columns (2) and (4)). However, in the post-Cold War period, countries with similar 
“political” preferences trade higher amounts of arms (column (6)), indicating that good diplomatic 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
R2	equals	respectively,	0.18,	0.09	and	0.09.	





relations turned relevant in the nineties, whereas differences in the level of democracy no longer 
plays a role. 
With respect to the security motives, a military or strategic pact signed between a supplier and 
recipient increases the volume of arms transferred by about 37 percentage points according to 
results in column (1), when not controlling for selection bias; however, conditional on the transfer 
having been approved, military pacts no longer determine the value of the transfer. With respect to 
conflict in a recipient country, the existence of a conflict in the two previous years positively affects 
arms transfers in the estimates in column (1), but once we control for selection bias, the coefficient 
turns negative, indicating that conditional on the transfer having been approved, the value of arms 
transferred to countries in conflict are around 20 percent lower than those sent to countries without 
internal conflicts.  
A mandatory embargo by the UN on a recipient had a non-significant effect on the volume of arms 
exported and hence, this variable has been excluded from the second stage to fulfil the exclusion 
restriction of the model. We have also excluded the degree of militarization of the society because it 
is not statistically significant in the second stage. This means that militarization in the exporter and 
importer countries also serve as exclusion variables. 
Regarding the other control variables, the value of arms transferred tends to be higher for suppliers 
and recipients with higher GDP and lower GDP per capita. However, the results are less consistent 
once the sample is divided into the Cold War and post-Cold War periods (columns (5) and (6)). On 
the other hand, recipient GPD and GDP per capita are only significant in the first period, indicating 
that only economic factors from the demand side are relevant, in column (6) GDP per capita are not 
significant and the coefficient of the exporter GDP is negative and significant, hiding perhaps non-
linearity effects22. 
Geographical characteristics, such as being a landlocked country, are not relevant in determining 
the value of exports, once a transfer has been approved, whereas sharing a border has a negative and 
significant effect on the value of arms exported for the entire period (column (4), coming mainly 
from the result for the Cold War period in column (5), since after 1990 the coefficient is not 
statistically significant).  
It may seem surprising that distance between a supplier and recipient has a significant and positive 
impact on the volume of arms exported if we assume that larger distances translate to higher 
																																																						
22	 Using	 common	 religion	 as	 additional	 variable	 in	 the	 first	 stage	 regression	 renders	 the	 coefficient	 of	 GDP	 in	 the	
exporter	country	in	column	(6)	non-significant,	while	the	rest	of	results	remain	very	similar.	
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transport costs. However, as indicated previously in the paper, the positive effect of distance can be 
explained by the fact that suppliers prefer selling large amounts of arms to more distant destinations 
to lessen the chance of subsequently facing these arms in battle. While a shared colonial past 
between a supplier and recipient has a positive impact on trade volume, the common language 
shows a negative effect, but mainly due to the Cold War period. 
Summarizing, we find no impact of democracy levels and democracy differences between a 
supplier and recipient on the value exported for estimations that include controls for sample 
selection bias and firm heterogeneity. The same happens with variables controlling for pacts 
between a supplier and recipient in the regressions with bilateral fixed effects.  
The fact that the inverse Mill's ratio is negative and significant in the second stage for the random-
effects estimation, indicates that there is evidence that selection bias is quantitatively important in 
this model, and that unobservables that affect both the probability of transfer arms and the value of 
the transfer are negatively correlated.  
 
Table 2: Value of the Arms Trade 
 
Next, we identify differences between the political determinants for the arms trade and the trade in 
goods by using identical models to estimate the probability of exporting arms and goods and to 
estimate the determinants of the value of traded arms and goods. The sample period is reduced to 
1962-2007 to ensure that the estimations are comparable, as described above.  
Table 3 shows the main results. The first two columns are estimated using a Probit model with 
country and time fixed effects as shown in Table 1; whereas the results in columns (3) and (4), are 
from the second step of the Helpman et al. (2008) procedure estimated using a Random Effects 
model augmented with the time averages of the time variant variables (as in Table 2). When 
comparing the results for the probability of transferring arms with that for the trade in goods in 
column (1) and (2) of Table 3, we find that the level of democracy affects both types of trade, but 
the magnitude and sometimes the direction of the effect differ. With respect to the probability of 
ordering an arms trade, more democratic exporters are likely to export more goods and more arms, 
whereas more democratic importers are likely to import more goods but receive fewer arms. The 
magnitude of the effects is four times higher for arms than for goods. With respect to the voting 
similarity with the United States, the effect is only positive and significant for the probability of 
trading goods, but not for arms. 
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Concerning the value of exported arms (columns (3) and (4) in Table 3), the levels of democracy in 
the exporter and importer countries do affect the value of goods exported, but not of arms, whereas 
the difference in democracy levels is positively related to the trade in goods only. 
Meanwhile, exporting countries tend to export more arms when they are less aligned with the 
United States in terms of voting similarity, whereas for total goods the effect is much smaller. 
Voting-behavior similarity between the exporter and importer appear to affect the volume in the 
same direction, but the effect is only statistically significant for the trade in goods. 
Table 3: Arms vs. Goods (1962-2007) 
 
In order to validate the results obtained, we carry out a number of robustness checks. First, we 
replicate the results in Table 1 for the 20 main exporters. Second, we estimate separate models for 
individual exporters. Then, we estimate the model replicating Akerman and Seim (2014). Finally, 
we consider lagged variables to account for potential endogeneity biases. 
The models estimated for the 20 main exporters are in Table A.6. The results, in terms of direction 
of the effects and significance levels, are similar to those obtained in Table 1 for 104 exporters. 
However, the marginal effects are much higher in Table A.6 than in Table 1, which is expected 
since these 20 exporters cover more than 95 percent of the market in MCWs. For example, having a 
military pact increases the probability of exporting MCWs by 10 percent according to the results in 
Table A.6, whereas when all exporters are considered, the marginal effect indicates that the 
probability of exporting MCWs for countries that have a military pact is only 2 percent higher. 
The results for single exporters are shown in Table A.7. The model is estimated using a Probit with 
time fixed effects for the United States, Russia, United Kingdom and France in columns (1) to (4), 
respectively. In the model for single exporters, we only include political factors that vary by origin 
and destination. In column (1) with the United States as exporter, the difference in democracy levels 
shows no influence in the probability of exporting, whereas the voting similarity index shows a 
positive and significance coefficient23, that is almost three times the one shown in Column (2) for 
Russia and four times the coefficient of the UK. Differences in the level of democracy seems to be 
affecting only the UK’s exports, whereas the security factors, namely conflicts, pacts and 
embargoes, are particularly relevant for the United States and Russia, the so called strategic 





in the estimated parameters. We leave for further research a most comprehensive identification of 
the main factors affecting not only the extensive margin, but also the intensive margin of exports for 
each main exporter of MCWs. 
As a third robustness check, a replication of Akerman and Seim (2014) is presented in Table A.8. 
We obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the variable measuring the square differences in 
polity2 (Polity_diff)2, but the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly different to the one reported in 
Akerman and Seim (2014), possibly due to the different number of observations in the sample24. 
The main divergence in results is that in our results the negative correlation between the differences 
in polity and the likelihood of an arms trade is still present in the post-Cold War period (column 5), 
whereas in column (10) of Akerman and Seim (2014), the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
We also evaluate the possible endogeneity of the voting similarity measures. A potential recipient 
of arms could alter its voting behavior to please or appease a potential supplier and boost the 
chances of making a deal. We test for the existence of an endogeneity bias by using a three-year lag 
of all variables measuring political orientation25. The results are shown in Table A.7 in the 
Appendix. According to our estimates, the bias, if it exists at all, is quantitatively very small and 
does not affect the main results.  
6 Conclusions 
The results presented in this paper show the impact of several economic, political and security 
factors on the probability and the value of arms transfers. We find that the level of democracy and 
the political orientation of the supplier and recipient countries, as well as the differences between 
them, are important determinants of the probability of trading arms. While suppliers with higher 
levels of democracy have a higher probability of transferring arms, we find the opposite to be true 
for the importer countries. However, these effects change in the post-Cold War period, when less 
democratic suppliers have a higher probability of transferring arms and the level of democracy in 
importer countries shows a decreasing effect on the probability of making a deal. 
In addition, when a country is –politically speaking– more closely oriented to the United States, 
specifically referring to higher voting similarity in the UN Security Council, the country is less 








1990, the statistical significance disappears. When two countries tend to be close in terms of voting 
similarity, they are more likely to agree to an arms trade, but again only when the model is 
estimated for in the Cold War period.  
Regarding the security factors, countries that are involved in conflicts are more likely to import 
arms, while countries under a UN embargo are less likely to do so. Militarization in the exporter 
country is positively correlated with the probability of transferring arms during the Cold War and 
negatively correlated in the post-Cold War period. 
In the second set of estimations, we analyze the determinants of the value of arms transfers, taking 
into account the two-stage decision process. The main results show that political factors are less 
relevant in explaining the value of the arms trade than in explaining the probability of trading arms. 
Indeed, we find no impact of the exporter and importer democracy levels and variables measuring 
democracy-level differences between a supplier and recipient on the value exported, once we 
control for sample selection bias and firm heterogeneity. The same happens with variables 
controlling for pacts between a supplier and recipient when the entire period is examined.  
The fact that the inverse Mill's ratio is negative and significant in the second stage model indicates 
that there is evidence that selection bias is quantitatively important in this model, and that 
unobservable factors that affect both the probability of an arms transfer and the value of the transfer 
are negatively correlated. The impact of some variables also changes with the end of the Cold War. 
More specifically, the polity difference coefficient is positive and statistically significant only for 
the Cold War period, indicating that the amounts traded with less similar countries in terms of 
democracy scores are on average higher in magnitude, conditional on the transfer having been 
approved. The coefficients of the supplier’s voting concordance with the United States in the 
UNGA is negative and significant when controlling for sample selection, indicating that increasing 
voting similarity with the United States is associated with lower exported values, once the transfers 
have been approved, but only during the Cold War period. Furthermore, the importer’s voting 
similarity with the United States does not seem to affect the amount of MCWs transferred. With 
respect to the voting similarity between the trading countries, in the post-Cold War, countries with 
similar “political” preferences trade higher amounts of arms indicating that good diplomatic 
relations turn out to be relevant in the nineties, whereas differences in the level of democracy no 
longer plays a role. 
With respect to the security motives, a military or strategic pact signed between a supplier and 
recipient increases the volume of arms transferred when we do not control for selection bias; 
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however, conditional on the transfer having been approved, military pacts no longer determine the 
value of the transfer. With respect to conflict in a recipient country, the existence of a conflict in the 
two previous years, once we control for selection bias, is negatively correlated to the average value 
of arms transferred, indicating that conditional on the transfer having been approved, the value of 
arms transferred to countries in conflict is around 20 percent lower than those sent to countries 
without internal conflicts.  
We also find that political determinants also play an important role in explaining the flow of goods 
between countries, but that the size of the impact is larger for the transfer of arms. 
Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including reducing the sample to the main 
twenty exporters and to potential reverse causality between UNGA voting behavior and agreements 
to transfer arms. Moreover, the results for single exporters show that it is important to account for 
heterogeneity in the effects across exporters.  
Overall, our results suggest that the political closeness between a pair of countries is an important 
determinant of an arms transfer, in addition to economic and strategic interests. Any attempt to 
regulate the trade of major conventional weapons should therefore reflect the political interests 
involved. Mandatory UN embargoes appear to be successful in decreasing the probability of arms 
transfers but do not have a significant impact on the value of the arms traded. 
Moreover, our results concerning the voting similarity with the United States show that arms 
transactions generate less dependence today than in the past, as suggested by Catrina (1988); and 
there are other factors that are more likely to generate dependence such as economic vulnerability 
or political stability. In this sense, it is crucial to consider political factors, such as the level of 
democracy or the political orientation, as explanatory factors of the arms trade. 
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Tables     
 Table 1: Probability of Agreeing on a Shipment of Arms 
 DEP.VAR. : Transfer Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period 1950-2007 1950-2007 1950-2007 Cold War Post Cold War 
IND. VARIABLES All All MRT Average Marginal Effects 
Ln GDP_i 0.405*** 0.564*** 0.0148*** 0.0166*** 0.00701 
 
(0.0129) (0.0691) (0.00185) (0.00454) (0.00428) 
Ln GDP_j 0.102*** 0.0608 0.00159 0.00796*** 0.00897* 
 
(0.00945) (0.0614) (0.00161) (0.00295) (0.00463) 
Ln GDPpc_i -0.0576** -0.393*** -0.0103*** -0.00469 -0.00971* 
 
(0.0268) (0.0693) (0.00184) (0.00486) (0.00525) 
Ln GDPpc_j 0.0198 0.177*** 0.00465*** -0.00254 -0.00445 
 
(0.0185) (0.0550) (0.00144) (0.00268) (0.00446) 
Ln distcap -0.119*** -0.160*** -0.00420*** -0.00519*** -0.00493*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0244) (0.000649) (0.000916) (0.000942) 
Landlocked_ij -0.0753** 0.134 0.00350 0.000212 0.0232 
 
(0.0341) (0.273) (0.00716) (0.00889) (0.0156) 
Colony 0.555*** 0.517*** 0.0184*** 0.0212*** 0.00831*** 
 
(0.0531) (0.0497) (0.00232) (0.00172) (0.00284) 
Comlang  0.0546 0.0658 0.00178 -0.000885 0.00388* 
 
(0.0381) (0.0449) (0.00125) (0.00158) (0.00204) 
Contig 0.0234 0.0826 0.00227 0.00361 0.00318 
 
(0.0735) (0.0680) (0.00196) (0.00253) (0.00288) 
Polity2ip_i 0.0134*** 0.0265*** 0.000695*** 0.000493*** -0.000522** 
 
(0.00237) (0.00362) (9.46e-05) (0.000148) (0.000230) 
Polity2ip_j -0.0142*** -0.0209*** -0.000548*** -0.000526*** -0.000463*** 
 
(0.00273) (0.00290) (7.66e-05) (0.000107) (0.000176) 
Poldif_ij -0.0220*** -0.0245*** -0.000644*** -0.000721*** -0.000830*** 
 
(0.00248) (0.00255) (6.73e-05) (9.30e-05) (0.000109) 
AgreeUN_US_i 1.032*** -0.120 -0.00314 -0.0165*** -6.38e-05 
 
(0.104) (0.107) (0.00282) (0.00426) (0.00525) 
AgreeUN_US_j -0.411*** -0.219* -0.00573* -0.0142*** -0.000493 
 
(0.106) (0.127) (0.00333) (0.00442) (0.00744) 
AgreeUN_ij 0.331*** 0.114** 0.00299** 0.00408** 0.00228 
 
(0.0380) (0.0510) (0.00134) (0.00193) (0.00179) 
Militarization_i 25.17*** 0.534 0.0140 0.273*** -0.875*** 
 
(1.337) (2.899) (0.0761) (0.100) (0.214) 
Militarization_j 2.045 -1.773 -0.0465 -0.0520 -0.165 
 
(1.720) (2.049) (0.0537) (0.0736) (0.112) 
Conflict last 2 years_j 0.218*** 0.175*** 0.00490*** 0.00428*** 0.00598*** 
 
(0.0249) (0.0247) (0.000742) (0.000957) (0.00146) 
Military pact 0.397*** 0.564*** 0.0196*** 0.0216*** 0.0124*** 
 
(0.0403) (0.0455) (0.00204) (0.00181) (0.00248) 




(0.155) (0.155) (0.00190) 
 
(0.00247) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 530,205 530,205 530,205 273,521 186,549 
Pseudo R2 0.346 0.435 
 
0.480 0.361 
Log likelihood -30203 -26094 
 
-14429 -10942 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2: Determinants of Arms Exports  
DEP. VAR.  
Ln Exports 1950-2007 1950-1989 1990-2007 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IND. VARIABLES Baseline Selection  Firm Het. Sel+FH Sel+FH Sel+FH 
       Ln GDP_i 0.873*** 0.499** 0.693*** 0.397* 0.277 -0.534** 
 
(0.235) (0.246) (0.227) (0.238) (0.441) (0.263) 
Ln GDP_j 0.994*** 0.824*** 0.953*** 0.773*** 1.141*** 0.442* 
 
(0.201) (0.203) (0.204) (0.206) (0.280) (0.267) 
Ln GDPpc_i -1.203*** -0.917*** -1.003*** -0.797*** -0.277 0.164 
 
(0.247) (0.250) (0.241) (0.245) (0.543) (0.274) 
Ln GDPpc_j -0.516*** -0.511*** -0.503*** -0.481*** -0.653*** -0.281 
 
(0.166) (0.168) (0.171) (0.173) (0.225) (0.259) 
Ln distcap 0.00465 0.226*** 0.0352 0.229*** 0.337*** 0.148** 
 
(0.0384) (0.0522) (0.0410) (0.0513) (0.0730) (0.0638) 
Landlocked_ij -0.131* 0.0551 -0.142** 0.0390 -0.111 -0.0286 
 
(0.0704) (0.0750) (0.0693) (0.0752) (0.110) (0.0962) 
Colony 0.203** -0.0267 0.0775 -0.0871 -0.170 -0.00945 
 
(0.104) (0.111) (0.109) (0.112) (0.133) (0.156) 
Comlang  -0.341*** -0.222*** -0.350*** -0.222*** -0.211* -0.0506 
 
(0.0819) (0.0818) (0.0808) (0.0825) (0.113) (0.109) 
Contig -0.0456 -0.263** -0.208 -0.376*** -0.361** -0.264 
 
(0.127) (0.133) (0.128) (0.131) (0.172) (0.161) 
Polity2ip_i -0.0125 -0.00683 -0.00163 2.59e-05 0.0204 -0.0160 
 
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0153) 
Polity2ip_j 
-
0.0285*** -0.0123 -0.0207*** -0.00809 0.0151* -0.00877 
 
(0.00783) (0.00829) (0.00764) (0.00799) (0.00893) (0.0120) 
Poldif_ij -0.0178** 0.00267 -0.0125* 0.00633 0.0282*** 0.00433 
 
(0.00766) (0.00835) (0.00740) (0.00817) (0.00959) (0.0124) 
AgreeUN_US_i 0.331 -1.487*** -0.409 -1.961*** -2.493*** -0.509 
 
(0.334) (0.490) (0.381) (0.498) (0.661) (0.728) 
AgreeUN_US_j 0.0444 0.493 -0.157 0.385 0.566 0.540 
 
(0.374) (0.392) (0.369) (0.392) (0.453) (0.499) 
AgreeUN_ij 0.713** 0.366 0.852*** 0.473 0.0153 1.690*** 
 
(0.305) (0.316) (0.307) (0.318) (0.385) (0.510) 
Conflict last2 years_j 0.113** -0.125* 0.00764 -0.194*** -0.221** -0.203* 
 
(0.0542) (0.0666) (0.0582) (0.0671) (0.0868) (0.105) 
Military pact 0.374*** 0.0776 0.182* -0.0663 -0.0745 -0.137 
 
(0.0863) (0.0955) (0.0943) (0.0997) (0.136) (0.136) 








(0.239) (0.377) (0.305) 
Z Hat 
  
0.208*** 0.192*** 0.260*** 0.178*** 
   
(0.0445) (0.0437) (0.0523) (0.0481) 
Z Hat2 
  
0.0120*** 0.0126*** 0.0155*** 0.0119*** 
   
(0.00285) (0.00284) (0.00302) (0.00354) 
Z Hat3 
  
0.000230*** 0.000255*** 0.000288*** 0.000250*** 
   
(6.21e-05) (6.37e-05) (6.24e-05) (8.81e-05) 
Observations 12,699 12,699 12,699 12,699 7,639 5,060 
Number of pairs 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,028 1,205 
R2 Overall 0.226 0.239 0.251 0.264 0.322 0.214 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.Estimation method: Mundlak approach for panel data (Probit random effects model including the averages of the 
time-variant variables, which coefficients are not reported to save space). 
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Table 3. Determinants of Goods Exports 
IND. VAR.: Trade in Arms (1/0) Trade in Goods (1/0) Ln Trade in Arms Ln Trade in Goods 
 Period: 1962-2007 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logit Logit  2nd step HMR   2nd step HMR 
Ln GDP_i 0.590*** -0.299*** 0.397* 1.897*** 
 
(0.0718) (0.0469) (0.238) (0.0673) 
Ln GDP_j 0.0281 0.0510 0.773*** 1.753*** 
 
(0.0617) (0.0574) (0.206) (0.0618) 
Ln GDPpc_i -0.485*** 0.873*** -0.797*** -0.0690 
 
(0.0713) (0.0422) (0.245) (0.0677) 
Ln GDPpc_j 0.216*** 0.109** -0.481*** -0.582*** 
 
(0.0547) (0.0475) (0.173) (0.0553) 
Ln distcap -0.165*** -0.379*** 0.229*** -1.428*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0182) (0.0513) (0.0266) 
Landlocked_ij 0.305 -0.657*** 0.0390 -0.489*** 
 
(0.310) (0.128) (0.0752) (0.0379) 
Colony 0.457*** 0.207** -0.0871 1.207*** 
 
(0.0517) (0.0846) (0.112) (0.135) 
Comlang  0.0813* 0.261*** -0.222*** 0.909*** 
 
(0.0462) (0.0292) (0.0825) (0.0614) 
Contig 0.0878 -0.0988 -0.376*** 0.592*** 
 
(0.0694) (0.0761) (0.131) (0.124) 
Polity2ip_i 0.0240*** 0.00558*** 2.59e-05 0.0473*** 
 
(0.00362) (0.00126) (0.0106) (0.00312) 
Polity2ip_j -0.0229*** 0.00392*** -0.00809 0.00609*** 
 
(0.00298) (0.00138) (0.00799) (0.00213) 
Poldif_ij -0.0234*** -0.00553*** 0.00633 0.00394** 
 
(0.00260) (0.00101) (0.00817) (0.00181) 
AgreeUN_US_i 0.00450 1.143*** -1.961*** -0.523*** 
 
(0.112) (0.0792) (0.498) (0.0985) 
AgreeUN_US_j -0.0731 0.265*** 0.385 -0.0674 
 
(0.127) (0.0661) (0.392) (0.0978) 
AgreeUN_ij 0.0698 0.0364 0.473 1.037*** 
 
(0.0519) (0.0276) (0.318) (0.102) 
Conflict last 2 years_j 0.178*** 0.0416*** -0.194*** -0.0617*** 
 
(0.0247) (0.0145) (0.0671) (0.0182) 
Military pact 0.530*** 0.443*** -0.0663 0.458*** 
 
(0.0463) (0.0416) (0.0997) (0.0534) 
Mandatory Embargo -0.558*** -0.428***  
 
 
(0.155) (0.0596)  
 Inverse Mills Ratio 
  
-1.345*** 1.082*** 















   
(6.37e-05) (2.58e-06) 
Observations 477,961 479,021 12,699 285,374 
Number of pairs 15,255 14,387 1,729 13,354 
Pseudo R2 (Overall) 0.421 0.325 0.264 0.592 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figures	
	
	 	
Figure	1:	Political	Dimensions	
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Notes:	Markers	indicate	countries.	The	red	markers	show	a	few	countries	as	examples	tracked	over	time;	the	figure	
shows	countries	that	were	members	of	the	UN	and	participated	in	the	voting	of	the	UN	General	Assembly.	
	 	
Figure	2:	Political	Orientation	and	Level	of	Democracy	in	Single	Years	
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Figure	3.	Most	important	exporters	(export	shares	in	%)	
	
Source:	SIPRI.		
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Figure	4.	Amount	traded	in	million	USD	
	
Source:	SIPRI.		
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